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Abstract
We have two upstream …rms producing each one a di¤erent good. De-
mands of the goods are independent, symmetric and linear. Goods are
sold to consumers through retailers. The units of both goods sold by re-
tailers cannot exceed the industry selling capacity that it is distributed
symmetrically among retailers. Taking as given the industry selling ca-
pacity, when the number of retailers decreases, they become bigger in the
sense that their selling capacity increases. Therefore, changing the num-
ber of retailers, we can check whether the countervailing power theory,
that states that bigger retailers obtain better deals from suppliers, holds
in our model. We obtain that the lower the number of retailers, the lower
the wholesale prices, only when the industry selling capacity is high.
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1 Introduction
Concentration in a market is usually associated with high prices. However, the
theory of countervailing power, …rst proposed by Galbraith (1952), argues that
a concentrated retail market can have a positive e¤ect on prices, because then
retailers are larger and this allows them to countervail the power of producers
and obtain better deals from them. If these better deals are passed on to the
consumers in the form of lower …nal prices, higher levels of concentration in the
retail sector will be associated with lower …nal prices.
The theory of countervailing power has had a lot of in‡uence and even the
competition authorities in both Europe and the United States recognize that a
concentrated downstream sector limits the anti-competitive e¤ects of upstream
mergers.1 However, within the framework considered in this article, character-
ized by linear supply contracts, theoretical studies do not give a conclusive an-
swer (Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Dobson andWaterson (1997), Tyagi (1999),
Iozzi and Valetti (2014), Gaudin (2018). For example, Tyagi (1999), which is
the closest to our analysis because it considers competition à la Cournot and a
wholesale price set by the producer, obtains that the wholesale price does not
depend on the level of concentration of the retail sector for the most common
demands including linear and constant elasticity demands.
Unlike the cited articles, we consider the case in which retailers are capacity
constraint. We …nd many cases in the literature where retailers are capacity
constraint. For example, when a retailer invokes an exclusive dealing clause
is as if it restricted its capacity to accommodate only one good (Gabrielsen
and Sorgard (1999)). O’Brien and Sha¤er (1997) obtain that a retailer has
incentives to limit her shelf space in order to reduce the number of goods she
can sell. Sha¤er (1991), Moner-Colonques (2006) and Inderst and Sha¤er (2007)
consider that shelf space is scarce and therefore retailers can not sell all the
available goods.
In all those papers, the restriction on capacity a¤ects the number of goods
the retailer can sell. Instead, in our case, capacity will put a limit on the units of
the goods the retailer can sell. The following quotation explains the di¤erence
between the two approaches. "We have in mind a situation in which each good
requires a minimum amount of shelf space (at least one shelf facing) for display
to consumers. In that case, it is the width of the shelf space that matters, and
not the depth, as units of the same good can be stacked one behind the other".
(O’Brien and Sha¤er (1997) p. 774). So far, papers have put the emphasis on
the width of the shelf space, whereas, in our case, it is the depth of the shelf
space that matters.
The importance of the depth of the shelf space has long been recognized
by the literature on multi-item newsvendor problems with capacity constraints.
1For example, although the expected market share of the Ensor / Stora merger was between
50 and 70% in the market of Liquid Packaging Board (LPB), the merger was cleared by the
European Commission because between 60 and 80% of the purchases were concentrated in a
single company, Tetrapak. (Motta(2006) p.122)
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The following quotation clari…es the issue: "The second problem that commonly
faces manufacturers, distributors, and retailers is determining how much capac-
ity of a certain resource (e.g., budget, shelf space, time) to allocate to one
activity when other activities are competing for that resource. For example, a
clothing retailer may have only a limited amount of shelf space to devote to
several sizes or styles of a certain good, such as sweaters. Given the variety of
sizes and styles of sweaters that the retailer sells, it is not obvious how much
shelf space should be devoted to each style and size given limited shelf space".
(Erlebacher (2000) p. 303)
In the present model, we have two …rms that produce each one a di¤erent
good. Demands of the goods are independent, symmetric and linear. Goods
are sold to consumers through retailers. Trade between manufacturers and
retailers takes place through linear supply contracts chosen by suppliers. The
units of both goods sold by retailers cannot exceed the industry selling capacity
that it is distributed symmetrically among retailers. We perform the following
comparative statics analysis. We keep constant the industry selling capacity
and we allow the number of symmetric retailers to vary to see its in‡uence
on equilibrium wholesale prices. This allows us to assess the validity of the
countervailing power theory, because the lower the number of retailers the bigger
their size measured by their selling capacity and higher the concentration.
The results I obtain depend on the market structure upstream. An upstream
monopoly will set the same wholesale price for each good that satis…es that it
is the highest one such that retailers sell up to capacity. When the number of
retailers increases, the upstream monopoly will raise the wholesale price up to
the point that retailers still sell up to capacity. It is similar to what happens in
a competitive market with a perfectly inelastic supply when demand increases:
sales remain constant but price increases.
With multiple upstream …rms and low enough industry capacity, retailers
are capacity constrained i.e. they would like to sell more than their capacity.
In this case, the demand of goods become interdependent in the sense that an
upstream …rm by lowering the wholesale price increases its sales and reduces the
sales of the competitor. It turns out that the demand of retailers of each good
becomes more elastic as the number of retailers increases. Therefore, the higher
the number of retailers, the more pro…table is for the suppliers to reduce the
wholesale prices because sales increase by more. This explains that equilibrium
wholesale prices decrease with the number of retailers, which contradicts the
countervailing power theory.
As far as retail prices are concerned, we never obtain that an increase in
concentration in the retailing sector reduces retail prices. If industry capacity is
large, retailers are not capacity constraint and the two markets are completely
separated. Then, Tyagi (1999) applies and the wholesale price is independent
of the number of retailers and retail price is decreasing in the number of retail-
ers. If industry capacity is small, then retailers are capacity constrained both
before and after the change in the level of concentration. Therefore, in any
case, retailers sell up to capacity and the retail prices are constant. The change
in the wholesale prices only a¤ects the division of rents between retailers and
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suppliers. The most interesting result is obtained for intermediate values of the
industry capacity. In this case, retailers are capacity constrained before the
change in concentration but they are not capacity constrained when concentra-
tion increases. Then, the increase in concentration reduces wholesale prices but
increases retail prices.
In the second part of the paper, we contribute to the debate on the e¤ect of
downstream mergers over buyer power. Many di¤erent reasons have been pro-
vided by the literature to explain why size obtained through merger can allow
retailers to obtain better deals from suppliers. For example, Katz (1987) and
Inderst and Wey (2011) suppose that buyers, by investing a …xed cost, can inte-
grate backwards to produce the good sold by suppliers. This possibility is more
pro…table and therefore it allows the buyer to obtain better deals from suppliers,
the larger the size of the buyer, because then it can spread this …xed cost over a
larger production. Chipty and Snyder (1999) study the case where one supplier
sells an homogeneous good to a given number of retailers that are monopolists in
their local markets. Then, the merger of retailers does not change the quantities
sold in each local market but it a¤ects the marginal contribution of each retailer
to industry pro…ts. This contribution increases more than proportionally with
the quantity traded when the unit cost of the supplier is increasing. Then the
merger of retailers is pro…table. In Snyder (1996) greater size can allow retailers
to break collusion among suppliers.
Next, keeping constant the industry selling capacity, we study the merger
of all retailers. With monopoly upstream we obtain that the merger is always
pro…table. With multiple upstream …rms, the pro…tability of the merger de-
pends on its e¤ect on wholesale prices. For low capacity levels, we obtain that
wholesale prices increase with the merger and therefore the merger of retailers is
not pro…table. For high capacity levels, instead, wholesale prices decrease with
the merger and the merger is pro…table.
For low capacity levels, we obtain an interesting relationship between market
structure upstream and market structure downstream. The upstream merger
makes pro…table the downstream merger. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided by Kastrinaki and Stoneman (2011) when they state that
"[w]e thus have evidence for all the studied countries, except the Netherlands,
that merger activity in manufacturing has led to merger activity in retailing"
p. 476.
In the next Section, we set up the model and study the relationship between
the size of retailers and wholesale prices. In Section 3, we study the pro…tability
of the merger of all retailers and relate it to the market structure upstream. In
the last Section, …nal comments put the paper to an end.
2 Model
Assume we have two producers (1 and 2). Producer 1 (2) produces good 1 (2).
Goods 1 and 2 are independent. Inverse demand of good  ( = 1 2) is given
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by  =  ¡ , where  and  are respectively the price and the quantity
sold of good . Upstream …rms sell the goods through symmetric retailers.
Retailers transform one unit bought to the upstream …rm into one unit sold to
…nal consumers. There are  retailers. Each retailer is denoted with a natural
number from 1 to . The distinguishing characteristic of each retailer is that it
has a limited shelf space. In particular, we assume that the total units of the
two goods that she can sell is lower than


. In particular, if  denotes the






both upstream and downstream …rms, all other costs are constant (with loss of
generality) and normalized to zero (with no loss of generality).
We analyze the following two stage game. In the …rst stage, producer 
( = 1 2) chooses its wholesale price  · . In the second stage, retailers






. As a matter of comparison, we will also consider the case where
producer 1 and 2 have merged (upstream monopoly).
2.1 Second stage




















When this constraint is satis…ed we say that we are in Region 1. If we are not
in Region 1, we are in Region 2, where retailers sell up to capacity. Then, the





















0 · 1 ·
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
The equilibrium of this game where retailers play up to capacity is the fol-
lowing:
1 =
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Figure 1: Second stage equilibrium.
The sales of good  in Region 2i are increasing in the capacity  and increas-
ing in the wholesale price  , whereas, in Region 1, the sales of good  do not
depend neither in  nor in  . The reason for this di¤erence is that in Region
2i, retailers are capacity constrained (i.e. they would like to sell a quantity of
both goods higher than their capacity), whereas in Region 1 they are not. The
fact that, in Region 2i, demands are interdependent (goods behave as if they
were gross substitutes) is at …rst sight surprising because goods are independent,
but this is explained by the fact that retailers are capacity constrained.
2.2 First stage
Without selling capacity constraints, the equilibrium wholesale prices are given















will still be the equilibrium of the present game, because deviation pro…ts can
not increase with the presence of selling capacity constraints. Then, wholesale




. They are increasing in . Retail prices are decreasing in
.
Next, we solve the model for the case  

(+ 1)
. 2 First we consider the
2 In Figure 1 we have that
(+ 1)





is the condition we assume to hold in the discussion that follows.
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case where producer 1 and 2 have merged (upstream monopoly) and then the
case where producer 1 and 2 are independent …rms (multiple upstream …rms).
2.2.1 Upstream monopoly
It is very easy to derive the optimal wholesale prices (for a formal proof see
Appendix 1). The merged …rm will set the same wholesale price ¤ for each

















Proposition 1 The equilibrium wholesale prices with monopoly upstream are









We have that ¤ decreases with  and increases with  The main purpose
of the paper is to check whether big retailers receive discounts from suppliers.
Given that retailers are symmetric, their size decreases with the number of …rms.
Next proposition compares wholesale prices for di¤erent values of the number
of retailers.
Proposition 2 With monopoly upstream, the wholesale prices with 1 retailers
are lower than the wholesale prices with 2 retailers if 1  2.
Therefore the countervailing power theory holds: the bigger the retailers the
lower the wholesale prices. However, this reduction in the wholesale prices when
concentration increases is not passed on to the consumers in the form of lower
retail prices. For  ·
1
1 + 1
, the reduction in the number of retailers, reduces
the wholesale price but it does not a¤ect the retail price, because in any case
retailers sell up to capacity. Therefore, the reduction in the number of retailers







the number of retailers decreases from 2 to 1 we have that the wholesale
price decreases but the retail price increases.3 For  ¸
2
2 + 1
, as indicated in
3For 1 the wholesale price is

2













and the quantity sold
in each market with 2, given that retailers sell up to capacity is

2
. Given the assumption,
the former expression is smaller than the latter and therefore the retail price is lower with 2
than with 1.
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Section 2.2, the wholesale price is

2
both for 2 and 1. Then, retail prices are
lower with 2, because competition is stronger.
2.2.2 Multiple upstream …rms
In order to obtain the equilibrium of the …rst stage, we compute the best
response function of producer 1 (the one of producer 2 is symmetric), whose
actual shape is stated in Appendix 2. To understand it we are going to show
how the pro…t of …rm 1 changes as 1 changes, taking as given 2 and .
Although in Figure 1 we have 4 di¤erent regions4, we focus on what happens in
Region 2i and Region 1. As it can be checked in Figure 1, for low values of 1
we are in Region 2i and for high values of 1, we are in Region 1. The pro…t of
…rm 1 is continuous and strictly concave both in Region 2i and Region 1, but
it has a kink in
_
 = 2 ¡
(+ 1)

 ¡ 2, the wholesale price that separates
Region 2i from Region 1. Therefore, depending on the parameters the optimal
choice for …rm 1 may lie in Region 2i, in Region 1 or in
_
 . This explains
that the best response of …rm 1 in the …rst stage is divided in di¤erent parts.
Given , this best response function crosses the 45 degree line only once. This
crossing point determines the equilibrium in wholesale prices that is stated in
proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium wholesale prices with multiple upstream …rms





if 0 ·  
2
3(+ 1)













Wholesale prices are the same with multiple upstream …rms as with monopoly
upstream if selling capacity is high. Multiple upstream …rms have an e¤ect




case, wholesale prices are higher with monopoly upstream than with multiple
upstream …rms. Therefore, the existence of multiple upstream …rms (weakly)
reduces wholesale prices. This result corresponds to the one obtained, among
others, by Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Iozzi and Valetti (2014) and Milliou and
Sandonís (2018).
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium wholesale prices as a function of capacity ()
for the case  = 3 and  = 15 (bold line) setting  = 1. They are increasing
for low capacities and decreasing for high capacities. In the former case, we
are in Region 2i where retailers are capacity constrained. They would like to
4The equilibrium can not lie neither in Region 2ii nor in Region 2iii. In Region 2ii …rm 2
obtains zero pro…ts because it sells nothing. It can increase its pro…ts by lowering 2 such that
wholesale prices lie in Region 2i, where …rm 2 makes positive sales. A symmetric argument
holds for Region 2iii.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium wholesale price.
sell more than the capacity they have. This implies that their sales increase
with capacity. Then, suppliers adjust their optimal wholesale prices upwards
when industry capacity increases. On the contrary, when capacity is large, we
are in the frontier between Region 1 and Region 2i where the unconstrained
sales coincide with the capacity retailers have. Then, when capacity increases,
wholesale prices should decrease to keep the equality between the unconstrained
sales and capacity.
The main goal of the paper is to study how the number of retailers (i.e. their
size) a¤ect the equilibrium wholesale prices. Suppose that 1  2. We want
to know when the wholesale prices will be higher either when the number of
retailers is 1 or when the number of retailers is 2. The countervailing power
theory would suggest that wholesale prices should be higher with 2 because
then retailers are smaller. Next Proposition, proved in Appendix 3, shows that
this is not always the case:
Proposition 4 With multiple upstream …rms and 1  2, wholesale prices
with 1 retailers are higher than the wholesale prices with 2 retailers if 0 
9
  e where e =
212
21 + 2 + 312
 Wholesale prices with 1 retailers are




We can check the result in Proposition 4 in Figure 2: the wholesale price for
 = 15 is lower than the wholesale price for  = 3 for low capacities and higher
for high capacities.
Countervailing power theory does not hold when capacity is low. It would
be interesting to …nd an intuition for this result. When capacity is scarce, the
equilibrium lies in the interior of Region 2i. The demand of retailers of good 
in Region 2i is given by:
 =
(¡ + ) + (+ 1)
2(+ 1)









 + (¡ +  +)
The previous expression is increasing in . This means that the higher ,
the more elastic the demand, and therefore the more pro…table is to undercut
the rival producer. This explains that the equilibrium wholesale price decreases
with .
To understand this counterintuitive result, that occurs in Region 2i, we are
going to analyze two extreme cases. We are going to compare how a monopolist
retailer ( = 1) and a competitive retailer ( = 1) adjust their sales when
upstream …rm  decreases its wholesale price. The starting point is such that
both producers set the same wholesale prices and therefore in both cases retailers
sell of each good half of their capacity. Think that now upstream …rm  reduces
its wholesale price. In the case of a competitive retailer the equilibrium condition
implies that price margins should be equalized across markets. If  are the
sales of good  and  the sales of good  of the competitive retailer after 
has decreased, we have:
¡  ¡ = ¡ 

 ¡
As we are in Region 2i the retailer sells up to capacity and therefore  =
 ¡  . Then we have:
¡  ¡ = ¡ ( ¡ 

 )¡ 
Solving for  we obtain
 =
 ¡  +
2
A monopolist retailer, instead, will increase the sales of good i but not to the
point to equalize margins, because as she sells more of good i she prefers to have
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a higher margin in good i. If  are the sales of a monopolist retailer of good
 we have:




 ¡  +
2
This implies that the increase in the sales of good  will be higher with the
competitive retailer than with the monopolist retailer because:

2
   

 
Then, producer  will be more interested in cutting the wholesale price 
when she faces a competitive retailer than when she faces a monopolist retailer.
Therefore, wholesale prices will be lower in the former case. The two extreme
cases, we have analyzed, illustrate the general result that in Region 2i increas-
ing competition downstream reduces wholesale prices, because it increases the
incentives of suppliers to reduce their wholesale prices.
The evolution of retail prices is much simpler than the evolution of wholesale
prices. For  ·
1
1 + 1
, the reduction in the number of retailers from 2 to 1
does not a¤ect retail prices, because in any case retailers sell up to capacity. The
changes in wholesale prices only a¤ect how rents are shared between suppliers
and retailers. For  
1
1 + 1
, the reduction in the number of retailers increases
retail prices.
3 Downstream mergers
























The typical shape of the industry pro…ts downstream5 is presented in Figure
3.
It is concave for low capacities, then increasing and …nally constant when
retailers are unconstrained. The concave part re‡ects a trade-o¤. For low
capacities, increasing capacity has the positive e¤ect on pro…ts of increasing
sales but the negative e¤ect of increasing the wholesale prices. The decreasing
part of the function identi…es a region where retailers would be better-o¤ if they
would agree collectively to restrict capacity.
5The actual picture is obtained by setting  = 1 and  = 4.
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Figure 3: Downstream pro…ts.
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Next we study the pro…tability of the mergers of retailers. In this setting,
mergers have two e¤ects on pro…tability: the typical anticompetitive e¤ect and
the e¤ect on wholesale prices. Since Salant et al. (1983) we know that, in a
Cournot setting, the anticompetitive e¤ect may reduce the pro…ts of merging
partners because nonmerging …rms increase their production. To guarantee that
this is not the case in our calculations, we restrict attention to the merger to
monopoly, where the reduction of competition increases for sure the pro…ts of
merging …rms. Furthermore, this allows us to use the results obtained so far
regarding the industry pro…ts with  …rms (see equation (1))
In the premerger situation we have  retailers operating in the market. Then,
all retailers merge. We want to study the pro…tability of this merger. A merger
is said to be pro…table if it increases the pro…ts of the downstream …rms (
¦(1)  ¦()).
As far as wholesale prices are concerned, proposition 4 tells us that the




sponds to the cuto¤ point identi…ed in Proposition 4 when 1 = 1 and 2 = ).






and it will not a¤ect
wholesale prices if  ¸

+ 1
. In this last case, we are in the unconstrained
case and the wholesale price is

2
both for the case of  retailers and for the
case of monopoly.
As far as the competition e¤ect is concerned, the merger has the positive
e¤ect of reducing output (increasing retail prices) only if capacity is high ( 

2 ), because otherwise …rms sell up to capacity in any market structure.
Combining the results on competition and wholesale prices we obtain four
di¤erent regions:
- If  ¸

+ 1







, the merger is pro…table, because it reduces both com-







, the merger is pro…table, because it reduces wholesale
prices and it does not a¤ect sales.
-If 0   ·

2+ 1
, the merger is not pro…table, because it increases whole-
sale prices and it does not a¤ect sales.
Next proposition summarizes the results on pro…tability.
Proposition 5 With multiple upstream …rms, the merger to monopoly of down-




It is very easy to …nd the counterpart of proposition 5 for the case where
producers have merged. Given the wholesale prices identi…ed in Proposition 1
13















In this case, downstream industry pro…ts are always decreasing in . Therefore,
¦(1)  ¦() holds for any level of capacity. Next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 6 With monopoly upstream, the merger to monopoly of down-
stream …rms is always pro…table.
Putting together propositions 5 and 6, we obtain that the merger of the up-




This is coherent with the empirical fact that parallel processes of consolida-
tion in both upstream and downstream sectors are observed. ("We thus have
evidence for all the studied countries, except the Netherlands, that merger ac-
tivity in manufacturing has led to merger activity in retailing" (Kastrinaki and
Stoneman (2011) p. 476).
4 Conclusion
We have considered two independent goods that are sold to consumers through
retailers. The units of both goods sold by retailers cannot exceed the indus-
try selling capacity that it is distributed symmetrically among retailers. We
consider possible di¤erent market structures. As far as the upstream sector is
concerned, we consider both the possibility that the two goods are produced by
the same …rm (upstream monopoly) and the possibility that they are produced
by di¤erent …rms (multiple upstream …rms). As far as the downstream sector
is concerned, we consider the case of a general number of symmetric retailers
i.e. all retailers have the same selling capacity.
The objective of this paper has been to test the e¤ect of retailers size on
the linear wholesale prices set by producers. The reference point is the coun-
tervailing power theory that implies a negative correlation between wholesale
prices and retailers size. This is what we obtain in this paper except when we
have multiple upstream …rms and the selling capacity is small. This also ex-
plains that the merger of all retailers is always pro…table except when we have
multiple upstream …rms and selling capacity is low, because then the merger
increases wholesale prices.
It is important to check the validity of the countervailing power theory in
order to be able to assess correctly the e¤ect of increases in concentration in the
downstream market on the overall industry. Our contribution has shed some
light on this issue for the case where the selling capacity of retailers is low with
respect to market demand. The type of capacity constraints, …rst introduced in




- The upstream monopolist will not choose the input prices in the interior of









She can increase the pro…ts by raising slightly the input prices: she sells the
same but a higher price.






, then again it can increase slightly input
prices and increase pro…ts, because it sells the same but at a higher price. The
same argument applies to Region 2iii
-The upstream monopolist will not choose input prices in the interior of












  1 + 2
























(¡ 1 ¡ 2)  0
Given the restriction, the two FOCs can not be satis…ed. Therefore there
are no input prices in Region 1 that maximize pro…ts.
- So the optimal prices should be in the frontier between Region 2i and



































Those are the optimal wholesale prices
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5.2 Appendix2
The best response of supplier 1 is given by.




½2 + (+ 1)
2

















½2 + (+ 1)
2
























2 + (+ 1)
2





























 2 · 
Given , this reaction function crosses the 45 degree line only once. This
crossing point determines the equilibrium in wholesale prices that is stated in
proposition 3. The equilibrium is symmetric and it will be in Region 2i or in the
frontier between Region 2i and Region 1. The portion of the reaction function
in Region 2i is:
2 + (+ 1)
2
and the one that lies in the frontier of Region
2i and Region 1 is : 2¡
(+ 1)









. It will be the equilibrium the one that …rst crosses the 45 degree

























cross in e =
212








 This implies that the wholesale price is
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